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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 David Dupree, a 44 year-old inmate currently serving his sentence at FCI 
Otisville, appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his motion for 
compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  The Government has 
filed a motion for summary affirmance.  For the following reasons, we grant the 
Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 In 2009, Dupree was convicted of armed bank robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113, use 
of a firearm during a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and conspiracy to commit 
armed bank robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 371.  He was sentenced as a career offender to 332 
months of imprisonment.  Dupree appealed and we affirmed.  See United States v. 
Dupree, 472 F. App’x 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2012).    
 After first unsuccessfully seeking compassionate release from the warden, Dupree 
filed a pro se motion in the District Court under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  (ECF 384.)  In that 
motion, Dupree argued that the District Court should order his immediate release because 
of the threat posed by COVID-19, because he has syphilis and a seizure disorder, and 
because he needs to care for his 63 year-old diabetic mother.  (Id. at 1.)  He asserted that 
he is “particularly vulnerable” to COVID-19 and that, as a prisoner, “he can’t practice 
social distancing or proper hygiene.”  (Id. at 7.)  The Government opposed the motion, 
arguing that “Dupree has not established that ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ 




reduction is warranted considering the danger that Dupree would pose to the community 
and the relevant § 3553(a) factors.”  (ECF 392, at 12.)        
 The District Court denied the motion, concluding that Dupree did “not establish[] 
a diagnosis of any of the medical conditions that the [Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC)] has identified as elevating an individual’s risk of serious illness or 
death if he contracted COVID-19” and that “the risk of exposure at Dupree’s facility 
appears to be minimal.”  (ECF 394, at 4.)  The District Court also held that, even if 
Dupree had established “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate 
release, the § 3553(a) factors weighed against any reduction in his sentence.  Dupree 
appealed (ECF 395), and he has filed a motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 6) and 
his opening brief (Doc. 9).  The Government has moved for summary affirmance.  (Doc. 
8.) 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See United States v. Pawlowski, 
967 F.3d 327, 329 n.4 (3d Cir. 2020).  We review the District Court’s order for abuse of 
discretion, and thus “will not disturb the District Court’s decision unless there is a 
definite and firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion 
it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.”  Id. at 330 (alteration, quotation 
marks, and citation omitted).  We may summarily affirm a district court’s order if the 
appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 




 The compassionate-release provision states that a district court “may reduce the 
term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of probation or supervised release” if it finds 
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  Before granting compassionate release, a district court must consider 
“the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”  
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).  Those factors include, among other things, “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 
§ 3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; “to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; and “to protect the public from further crimes 
of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).  
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dupree’s motion.  
Dupree’s concerns about COVID-19 do not make his situation extraordinary or 
compelling, in part because, according to the CDC, his age and medical conditions do not 
put him at high risk from the disease.  Indeed, Dupree concedes that he “is fortunate 
enough not currently to suffer from any underlying medical conditions that [are] known 
to increase the severity of the virus ….”  Appellant’s Br. 4.  He maintains, however, that 
“the mere fact of his confinement in a Correctional Institution exacerbates the likelihood 
that he will catch the virus.”  Id.  But we have held that “the mere existence of COVID-




independently justify compassionate release, especially considering BOP’s statutory role, 
and its extensive and professional efforts to curtail the virus’s spread.”  United States v. 
Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020).  And Dupree did not contest the District Court’s 
observation that “the risk of exposure at Dupree’s facility appears to be minimal:  as of 
today’s date, there are three active cases of COVID-19 among inmates and two active 
cases among staff at FCI-Otisville, with 23 inmates and 14 staff listed as recovered from 
infection.”  (ECF 394, at 4.) 
 Moreover, even if there were an extraordinary and compelling reason for 
compassionate release, the applicable § 3553(a) factors do not support relief.  With 
respect to the circumstances of the offense, Dupree committed an armed bank robbery, 
during which he pointed his gun at individuals in the bank.  See Dupree, 472 F. App’x at 
110; cf. United States v. Lyons, 450 F.3d 834, 836 (8th Cir. 2006) (recognizing violent 
nature of armed bank robbery).  As the District Court explained, he received a below-
guidelines sentence that was calculated to address the risk he posed to the public as a 
career offender.1  See United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(noting that sentence reduction was not warranted where, among other factors, “the court 
had already varied downward by five years from Ruffin’s guidelines range when 
imposing [a] lengthy sentence”).  According to the District Court, the sentence was 
deemed necessary to protect the public, promote respect for the law, and serve the 
 




purposes of deterrence and adequate rehabilitation.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court’s assessment of the § 3553(a) factors.   
 Based on the foregoing, Dupree’s challenge to the District Court’s order does not 
present a substantial question.  Therefore, we grant the Government’s motion for 
summary affirmance and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  In light of 
this disposition, Dupree’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.   
 
F. App’x at 112.   
